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INHERENT POWER AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
REFORM
I. INTRODUCTION
Little novelty exists in current pleas for general court reform.
In the many pages of text, law review articles, and committee
reports devoted to the subject, it has become fashionable to quote
from Dean Roscoe Pound's now famous address to the American
Bar Association in 1906 wherein he decried the disorganized state
of our nation's courts and outlined his ideas on the unified court
system.' The road to reform has been long and rocky with little
apparent progress. Where changes have been made, they have
often lagged far behind the ever-increasing demands for more effi-
cient and effective courts.
In Wisconsin, as early as the first years of this century, the
demand for structural court reform culminated in the so-called
"Winslow Report" of 1915 which advocated adoption of a unified
system with "the judicial power of the state. . . vested in one great
court."' 2 The plea went unheeded and since that time a number of
study committees created by the state bar and the legislature have
reviewed the problem. The court reorganization of 1962 was the
result of these efforts. While it represented a decided step forward,
it stopped somewhat short of the complete revision which has been
advocated and which may well be required.
The primary focus of proposals for reform has been on struc-
tural reorganization. As such, they have been directed to the legis-
lature. The adoption of a unified court system or even a rearrange-
ment of the present court structure would no doubt require legisla-
tive action or even a constitutional amendment.' However, it has
been recognized that a good part of the blame for the problems
which now face the judiciary can be attributed to internal disorgan-
ization and lack of centralized, efficient court administration.
Chief Justice Earl Warren in his address to the American Law
Institute in 1967 stated:
In a century which has been characterized by growth and mod-
ernization in science, technology and economics, the legal fra-
ternity is still living in the past. We have allowed the mainstream
1. 29 ABA Reports 395 (Part I, 1906).
2. Report of Joint Committee of the Legislature of Wisconsin on Investigation of the
Organization and System of the Courts in Wisconsin 3 (Madison 1915).
3. See art. VII, § 5, Wisconsin Constitution.
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of progress to pass us by. . . . Our failure to act becomes alarm-
ing when a competent. . . judge must admit in testimony before
a Senate committee that unless something new and effective is
done promptly in the area of judicial research, coordination and
management, the rule of law in this nation cannot endure. When
justice is denied to any of our citizens because of faulty adminis-
tration our failure to act becomes inexcusable.4
In its report on the state of the judiciary, the Citizens Study
Committee on Judicial Organization noted that there has been
little change in the administration of Wisconsin's courts since the
mid 1800's. In reality, the report continued, there is no administra-
tion at all. Trial judges are their own boss, free to operate their
courts as they see best, on their own schedule and with their own
methods. The Committee further noted that the supreme court,
vested by the constitution with supervisory powers over the lower
courts, has not used this power to exercise administrative authority
over the day-to-day operation of the trial courts.5
The Committee report concluded that administrative practices
have not changed because they are concealed from public view, not
very glamorous, and difficult to understand.' There is a recognized
need for administrative leadership and a system of organizational
management which can only be accomplished by a concerted effort
to change old practices. The Committee report summarized its
findings:
There is no effective administrative structure in Wisconsin's
court system and no one has responsibility for overall direction
of its operations. The result is a highly segmented, non-uniform
system in which each judge exercises substantial control over the
administration of his individual court without regard to the rest
of the system. The product is a court system which is neither
economical nor efficient.7
It is a thesis of this article that a resolution of this aspect of
the judiciary's problems may not require legislative action. It may
well be that, should the legislature at some point determine to
change the structural organization of the judicial system, such a
change could adequately incorporate measures to resolve the
internal and administrative problems. This was the proposal of the
4. See Citizens Study Committee on Judicial Organization 85 (Madison 1973).
5. Id. at 86.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 87-88.
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Citizens Study Committee. However, there is no immediate pros-
pect of legislative action and if this portion of the problem can be
resolved as well by judicial directive as by legislative action, there
appears to be no reason to delay the necessary action.
In succeeding sections, this article will explore the basis for
possible court action to implement administrative reforms and
consider selected problems presented by the proposals of the Su-
preme Court's Chief Judge Study Committee.8 Those proposals
involve the creation of administrative court districts headed by a
chief judge whose duties will substantially parallel the recommen-
dations of the National Conference of Metropolitan Courts.'
II. BASIS FOR COURT ACTION
A. Source and Definition of Inherent Power
Under what authority might the supreme court order and im-
plement administrative court reforms should it determine that they
are desirable? It seems apparent that the traditional adjudicatory
powers will not support such quasi-legislative action. Further, as
noted in the Citizen's Study Committee Report, 10 the superintend-
ing power of the court has not been construed to grant authority
to administer the day-to-day operations of the trial courts. While
the power affords a wide range of action with respect to internal
housekeeping, its exercise has been more closely related to the
court's appellate jurisdiction and the adjudication of legal issues."
The aspect of judicial authority which appears to offer the
greatest promise in this area is the concept of inherent power. A
court's "inherent power," as evidenced by the term, arises from the
very fact of the court's existence and, therefore, is not dependent
upon a special legislative or constitutional grant.'2 The source of
this power is found in the constitutional separation of powers prin-
ciple which sets up an independent judiciary. To insure its inde-
pendence, the courts have argued, the judiciary must possess the
power, not only to protect itself from attacks by the co-ordinate
branches, but also to take the initiative in preserving its existence
when the need arises. 13
8. Minutes of April 5, 1974, Meeting of Chief Judge Study Committee.
9. See Standards Relating to the Office of Trial Court Chief Judge (National Confer-
ence of Metropolitan Courts, 1973).
10. Note 4, supra.
11. See, generally, Shavie v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 379, 182 N.W.2d 505 (1970).
12. See State ex rel Gentry v. Becker, 351 Mo. 769, 174 S.W.2d 181 (1943).
13. See State ex rel Schneider v. Cunningham, 39 Mont. 165, 101 P. 962 (1909); State
1974]
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This "inherent power of the judiciary" is generally said to allow
a constitutional court to do whatever is reasonably necessary to
preserve and guarantee the efficient and orderly administration of
justice.'4 Definitionally, then, the court's inherent power is couched
in broad expansive terms. A more realistic idea of the scope of the
power can be gained by looking at the case in which it has been
employed. The summary of cases which follows will afford a realis-
tic picture of how courts have applied the concept of inherent
power. Special attention wil be paid to the Wisconsin authority.
B. Judicial Application of Inherent Power Principles
1. As Relating to Court Personnel
The appointment, dismissal and compensation of court-related
personnel has, both in the past and at present, been a frequent
source for the application of inherent power principles. In re Jani-
tor of the Supreme Court,5 an early Wisconsin case, is a leading
decision in this area. In that case the state superintendant of public
property attempted to remove the court-appointed janitor of the
supreme court from his position and replace him with his own
appointee. In its review of the situation, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court noted that it had been customary for the court to appoint
its own janitor who also served as librarian and general assistant
to the justices. It was important, the court said, that the person
serving in such capacity be one who could understand the manner
of the court's functions and generally get along with the justices.
The court concluded that the power of appointment of such a key
court employee should reside in the court itself and, therefore, also
the power of removal should reside in the court. The order of the
superintendant, the court said, was a direct invasion of the rights
and privileges of the court and of the justices. The basis for the
decision was the court's inherent power:
It is a power inherent in every court of record, and especially
courts of last resort, to appoint such assistants; and the court
itself is to judge of the necessity. This principle is well settled and
familiar, and the power so essential to the expedition and proper
conducting of judicial business, that it may be looked upon as
ex rel Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373, 68 P. 689 (1902); Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35,
384 P.2d 738 (1963); State ex rel Weinstein v. St. Louis Co., 451 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1970);
Knox Co. Council v. State ex rel McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E.2d 405 (1940).
14. State ex rel Weinstein v. St. Louis Co., 451 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1970).
15. 35 Wis. 410 (1874).
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very doubtful whether the court can be deprived of it. As a power
judicial and not executive or 'legislative in its nature, and one
lodged in a co-ordinate branch of the government separated and
independent in its sphere of action from the other branches, it
seems to be under the protection of the constitution, and there-
fore a power which cannot be taken from the court, and given
to either the executive or legislative departments, or to any offi-
cer of either of those departments."
The court concluded that the superintendant had exceeded his
statutory authority in removing the court-appointed janitor and
ruled that he be retained until dismissed by the court or until he
voluntarily resigned the position. As to further interference from
the superintendent, the court stated:
In case his name shall be omitted by the superintendent from the
pay-roll, so that his compensation cannot be made to him
monthly as heretofore, it will devolve upon the next legislature
to make the requisite appropriation and likewise to provide
against the recurrence of similar contingencies in the future. It
is not within the range of presumption, or a supposition to be for
a moment indulged, that any legislative body will neglect or
refuse to make such appropriation or to enact suitable measures
for the future; but if it should refuse to appropriate, the appointee
will have his remedy by action against the state in the manner
prescribed by law.' 7
A subsequent Wisconsin case, Stevenson v. Milwaukee
County," echoed In re Janitor with respect to a court-appointed
bailiff whom the defendant county refused to pay. The bailiff was
awarded judgment against the county by the circuit court and the
county board appealed, contending that the circuit court had no
authority to make the appointment and, alternatively, if there was
such authority, there was no necessity since the sheriff, pursuant
to statute, had appointed two deputies to attend the court in ques-
tion. The supreme court dismissed both contentions:
We shall not enter into any extended discussion of the power of
circuit judges to appoint attendants, because it seems to be well-
settled that the power exists in proper cases. Under the Constitu-
tion of this state the judicial powers of the state in matters of law
and equity are vested in a Supreme Court, circuit courts, and
16. Id. at 419.
17. Id. at 421-422.
18. 140 Wis. 14, 121 N.W. 654 (1909).
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other courts provided for in that instrument. The circuit courts
of this state therefore are created by the constitution and do not
depend solely upon statute for their powers. Independent of stat-
ute such constitutional courts have inherent power to make such
rules and orders as may be necessary to properly perform their
functions. . . . The power to appoint necessary attendants upon
the court is inherent in the court in order to enable it to properly
perform the duties delegated to it by the Constitution. 9
As to the necessity of the appointment, the court stated:
The power to determine the necessity must rest somewhere, and
no place, we think, more appropriately than with the judge mak-
ing the appointment, for it is for him to determine when a necess-
ity exists in the administration of the business of his court; and
it necessarily follows from the nature of the case that a broad and
liberal discretion is vested in the judge respecting this power.
Whether the power of the judge in determining the necessity is
subject to review in any case, and, if so, in what manner and
under what circumstances, we need not and do not decide, be-
cause in the case before us the record shows no abuse of power
by the judge in making the appointment. . . . We think it clear
that where it seems to the judge necessary that an attendant upon
the court in addition to the sheriff and his deputies, should be
appointed it is his right to make the appointment for such time
as the necessity exists. . . . When that necessity exists must be
determined by the judge of the court in which the appointment
is made."0
The cause was remanded for a new trial on the question of the
amount to be paid, the court deciding that the remuneration should
be the same as that provided for in the statutes for deputies ap-
pointed to the position by the sheriff. Justice Marshall, dissenting,
contended that In re Janitor should be no authority since in that
case, there was no statutory provision for the appointment of the
attendant in question. Justice Marshall would have limited the
court's inherent power:
It may well be that courts are not obliged to bow to the legislative
will in such matters, but they ought to in all cases where their
constitutional authority is not prejudicially interfered with. The
written law does not leave any occasion for use of the court's
inherent power except in purely emergency cases, and it is mani-
fest that no such case existed in the instance before us."
19. Id. at 17, 121 N.W. at 655-656.
20. Id. at 19, 121 N.W. at 656.
21. Id. at 22-23, 121 N.W. at 657.
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An early Montana case,22 on substantially identical facts,
adopted Justice Marshall's position in denying recovery. The court
there noted that the very concept of inherent power carded with
it the implication that it would not be used where established
methods could accomplish the desired results. Only when those
methods failed, the court noted, should a court be authorized to
proceed under its inherent power to fill the void. That the separa-
tion of powers guaranteed independence to the separate branches
of government, the court concluded, did not mean that there
should not be cooperation.
In an earlier case,? the Montana court affirmed a trial court
order compelling the state to raise stenographic salaries. Noting
that if the state could regulate the salaries it could, to some degree,
subject the courts to its control, the Montana Supreme Court
avoiding this result held that the power to set the salaries must
coincide with the power to appoint the employees which rested with
the court. Referring to the provision of the Montana constitution
which established separate branches of government, the court
stated:
It is within the knowledge of every intelligent man that its pur-
pose is to constitute each department an exclusive trustee of the
power vested in it, accountable to the people alone for its faithful
exercise, so that each may act as a check upon the other, and thus
may be prevented the tyranny and oppression which would be the
inevitable result of a lodgment of all power in the hands of one
body. It is incumbant upon each department to assert and exer-
cise all its power wherever public necessity requires it to do so;
otherwise, it is recreant to the trust reposed in it by the people.2
The court then discussed the legitimacy of the raise in salary:
[I]t is manifest that the power to select the proper employees
could not with propriety be vested elsewhere than in the court
itself; and if is equally manifest that the power to say whether it
may or may not be necessary to have assistance, and what the
qualifications of the assistants shall be, may not be vested else-
where. If the power of appointment exists at all, it is a necessary
power of the court, and, since the qualifications of the individual
desired is determined in a measure by the amount of compensa-
tion paid for his services, the power to fix the compensation is
also a necessary power. In short, the court has the inherent power
22. State ex rel Hillis v. Sullivan, 48 Mont. 320, 137 P. 392 (1913).
23. State ex rel Schneider v. Cunningham, 39 Mont. 165, 101 P. 962 (1909).
24. Id. at -, 101 P. at 963.
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to select and appoint its own necessary assistants and make the
compensation due for their services a charge against the state as
a liquidated claim. 3
The Montana cases can probably be reconciled on the basis that,
in one case, as opposed to the other, an established procedure for
the appointment and compensation of the employees had been set
forth by the legislature. This limitation on the judiciary's inherent
power has been recognized in other jurisdictions."8 The limitation
appears to be more the result of a strict application of the "reason-
able necessity" test than a separate restriction on the scope of
inherent power. Unless the established procedure proves ineffec-
tive, there is no "necessity" for court action.2Y
An interesting variation of the usual inherent power case was
presented by a New Jersey case 2 where a statute authorizing
judges to select and set compensation for probation officers was
challenged as unconstitutional because it required judges to inter-
rupt their adjudicatory duties. The court's discussion of the inher-
ent power concept is worthy of note.
25. Id. at -. , 101 P. at 964.
26. In a more recent Missouri case, for example, the issues were presented as to who
should select and set the compensation for the administrative and detention personnel
connected with the juvenile court. The Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel Weinstein
v. St. Louis Co., 451 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. 1970), recognized that the questions involved the
"fundamental nature and function of the judicial department of government and of the
power which possesses to carry out such functions," and held that the judiciary's inherent
power should be exercised only on occasions where necessary personnel and facilities are
not provided for by conventional methods. "When, however, conventional sources do not
provide necessary funds, the court does have inherent authority to do those things essential
to the performance of its inherent and constitutional functions." Also see, In re Appoint-
ment of Clerk of Court of Appeals, 297 S.W.2d 764 (1957); Brydonjack v. State Bar of
California, 208 Cal. 447, 281 P. 1018 (1929); and Leahy v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d
577 (1949).
27. In Leahy v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949), a local court ordered raises
for certain court employees. Discussing the traditional separation of powers, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court noted that the fiscal powers were of a particularly legislative nature
and rejected the contention that a statute authorizing the state to set the salaries in question
was unconstitutional. As to the court's inherent authority, it was determined that the court
must first comply with reasonable fiscal regulations set by the legislature and it was only
when such regulations were so arbitrary or capricious as to impair the efficient and orderly
administration of justice that the court could employ its inherent power as a remedial
measure. However, in State ex rel Houey v. Noble, 118 Ind. 350, 21 N.E. 244 (1889), a
statute setting the term of office and rate of compensation for certain court assistants was
held to be an unconstitutional infringement of the judicial power. The appointment of
persons to assist the judiciary in the administration ofjustice, the court said, was the court's
job.
28. In re Salaries for Probation Officers of Bergen Co., 58 N.J. 422, 278 A.2d 417
(1971).
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It may be conceded that the appointment of probation officers
and the fixing of their salaries are not, at least in the purest sense,
judicial acts. But the doctrine of the separation of powers was
never intended to create, and certainly never did create, utterly
exclusive spheres of competence. The compartmentalization of
governmental powers among the executive, legislative and judi-
cial branches has never been watertight.29
As to the basis for the court's authority to make the appointments,
the court stated:
In a number of other states, statutes give judges the right to
appoint probation officers, subject to the approval of the county.
Such statutes have been uniformly interpreted to limit the power
of the county effectively to disapprove to those cases where there
has been a showing that the action of the judges was arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable. . . . Other states, quite apart from
statute have held that courts possess the inherent power to ap-
point probation officers as well as other personnel necessary to
a proper administration of justice and to see that they are paid.
Whether justification for the action is to be found in a statute,
or in the inherent power of the courts properly to maintain them-
selves, we have no doubt that such power exists and that it will
be set aside only upon a showing that its exercise was arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable. (Cites omitted.) °
The duty to act reasonably with respect to the appointment and
compensation of court employees is further demonstrated by a
recent Indiana case 31 where judges sought to compel defendant
county to pay court employees at a rate set by the judge rather than
under the schedule established by the county. In upholding the
judicial action, the Indiana Supreme Court stated:
Judges should constantly be aware that their constitutional re-
sponsibility to maintain the judicial system carries with it the
corresponding responsibility to limit their requests to those
things reasonably necessary in the operation of their courts and
to refrain from any extravagant, arbitrary or unwarranted ex-
penditures.3
In the course of its decision the court rejected the county's conten-
29. Id. at __, 278 A.2d at 418.
30. Id. at , 278 A.2d at 419. Also see Noble Co. Council v. State, 125 N.E.2d 709,
234 Ind. 172 (1955).
3 1. McAfee v. State ex rel Stadola, 284 N.E.2d 778 (Ind. 1972).
32. Id. at 782.
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tion that, because the courts were continuing to function without
the employee pay raises, the judge's requests were, per se, unrea-
sonable.
Failure to follow established procedures will not always render
court action under its inherent power unreasonable. In Smith v.
Miller,33 an action in mandamus to compel a county board to
approve court-set salaries for court employees, the Colorado Su-
preme Court upheld the judicial action on the grounds of inherent
power, stating:
: . . [I]n the absence of a clear showing that the acts of the judge
in fixing such salaries were arbitrary and capricious and that the
salaries so fixed are unreasonable and unjustified, . . . it is the
ministerial duty of county commissioners to approve them and
to provide the means for payment of such salaries.3
In addition, the burden of showing unreasonableness was upon the
board. The court noted that the proper procedure, which involved
a prior request to the county board, had not been followed, but
affirmed the case on the grounds that, had the board disapproved
the request, the court would have had the inherent power to compel
payment in the absence of a showing of unreasonableness.
On the basis of the language in Stevenson,35 Wisconsin courts
do not appear to be strictly limited in their use of inherent power
by so-called "established methods." Even in the face of a legisla-
tive or administrative regulation which is alleged to provide for the
deficiency in question, a Wisconsin court may determine it "rea-
sonably necessary" to take independent action under its inherent
power. Other Wisconsin cases recognize the importance of cooper-
ation between the branches of government. However, in at least
one case, the court has noted that while an essentially judicial
power may be delegated to the legislature for procedural efficiency
purposes, it remains ajudicial power and therefore still exercisable
by the judicial branch. 6
33. 153 Colo. 35, 384 P.2d 738 (1963).
34. Id. at -, 384 P.2d at 741.
35. 140 Wis. 14, 121 N.W. 654 (1909).
36. See In re Constitutionality of Section 251.18, Wis. Stats., 204 Wis. 501, 236 N.W.
717 (1931), where the court noted that by customs or constitutional mandate or the inherent
necessity of the situation, branches of the government have exercised other powers than
those which belong peculiarly to them. The fact that the legislature has acquired a power
of the judiciary, the court held, does not mean that it is not still essentially a judicial power
and therefore still exercisable by the judicial branch. The limit of the court's inherent power,
the supreme court concluded in that case, was a judicial question.
[Vol. 58
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In Brydonjack v. State Bar of California,37 the issue was
whether the judiciary or the legislature should have the authority
to admit persons to the practice of law. The California Supreme
Court discussed the spirit of cooperation which should exist be-
tween the branches of government:
Our courts are set up by the constitution without any special
limitations; hence the courts have and should maintain vigour-
ously all the inherent and implied powers necessary to properly
and effectively function as a separate department in the scheme
of our state government. . . . But this does not mean that the
departments of our government are not in many respects mu-
tually dependent. Of necessity the judicial department as well as
the executive must in most matters yield to the power of statu-
tory enactments.3
The court concluded by noting that although the admission to
practice is a power inherent in the judiciary, the legislature may
place reasonable restrictions on the practice of law.
In a recent far-reaching decision the Michigan Supreme Court
in Judges for the Third Judicial Circuit v. County of Wayne, 39 held
it within the inherent power of the judiciary to hire necessary ad-
ministrative personnel to assist the judges even after the county
specifically refused to appropriate funds for their salaries. The
court recognized that although such power in the judiciary was
administrative in nature and similar to that vested in the executive
department, it was a judicial power in the sense that its exercise
was essential to the proper functioning of the court.
On rehearing, the supreme court held that where the reasona-
bleness of the amount requested by the circuit judges was uncon-
tested, the judges had the authority to hire law clerks and a judicial
assistant and to require the county to appropriate funds required
for their compensation. 0 Further, the county was to pay the rec-
ommended compensation for probation officers despite the
county's contention that it had insufficient money to meet the
demands on its treasury and that it had the exclusive power to
determine where the available funds should go. The Michigan Su-
preme Court, recognizing the problem posed by the case, estab-
lished a procedure for resolving future conflicts. It required subor-
37. 208 Cal. 447, 281 P. 1018 (1929).
38. Id. at ____ 281 P. at 1020.
39. 383 Mich. 10, 172 N.W.2d 436 (1969).
40. 386 Mich. 1, 190 N.W.2d 228 (1971).
1974]
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dinate courts to submit all future proposals for orders involving the
expenditure of public funds to the constitutional office of court
administrator for approval.
In a subsequent case, the Michigan Supreme Court held that a
collective bargaining agreement executed by the county board of
commissioners, as employer, was not binding on the judicial dis-
trict and its employees." In the course of its opinion, the court
reaffirmed the inherent and statutory power of the courts to set the
compensation of its employees in the face of the county's argument
that the salaries must be fixed to fit within appropriate limits. 2
2. As Relating to Court Facilities, Necessities and Expenses.
The judiciary has also applied its inherent power with respect
to the provision of courtroom facilities and other necessities. The
prevailing consideration in this line of cases is that justice cannot
be efficiently administered without adequate courtroom facilities
and other necessities. An early Wisconsin case, In re Courtroom
and Office of the Fifth Branch Circuit Court,43 involved an order
by the judge for the court in question which sought to enjoin county
supervisiors in their efforts to move the court to what were consid-
ered by the judge to be inadequate facilities. The county, on appeal,
challenged the jurisdiction of the court in making such an order.
The supreme court reviewed the events which had precipitated the
conflict, concluding that the circuit court judge was correct in his
factual conclusion that the proposed quarters were inadequate.
Noting that this was a case of first impression, the supreme court
held that the county's contention that the duty of providing a
courtroom (vested by law in the board) was the board's alone was
erroneous. Citing the statutory provision which required the board
to provide courtrooms and office space for circuit judges, the court
stated:
It was thus made the statutory duty of the county board to
provide suitable and convenient quarters for the accommodation
of the court. There was a duty to do so under the constitution,
independent of and regardless of any statute, and it is not correct
41. Judges of the 74th Judicial District v. Co. of Bay, 385 Mich. 710, 190 N.W.2d 219
(1971). The dispute centered around efforts by defendant union, recognized by the county
as the exclusive bargaining agent for the county employees, to force court employees to join.
A charge of unfair labor practices was filed by the union against the judges for refusing to
bargain and the judges countered with an injunction aimed at prohibiting the union from
interfering with court employees.
42. Id. at -, 190 N.W.2d at 226.
43. 148 Wis. 109, 134 N.W. 490 (1912).
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to say that there is a discretion vested in the county board in
reference to the selection of courtrooms which is entirely beyond
the control of the courts. If such were the case, it would be within
the power of county boards to at least greatly curtail the useful-
ness of circuit courts by declining to furnish them quarters in
which judicial business could be transacted. The authorities, inso-
far as any can be found on the subject, are to the effect that a
constitutional court of general jurisdiction has inherent power to
protect itself against any action that would unreasonably curtail
its powers or materially impair its efficiency."
The court concluded:
A county board has no power to even attempt to impede the
functions of such a court, and no such power could be conferred
upon it. Circuit courts have the incidental power necessary to
preserve the full and free exercise of their judicial functions, and
to that end may, in appropriate cases, make ex parte orders
without formally instituting an action to secure the desired re-
lief.45
The order of the circuit judge was held to be tantamount to an
order to show cause coupled with a temporary restraining order
operative until an open hearing could be held on the issue. The use
of the injunction, the court said, was an error in form only and did
not negate the authority of the court to exercise its discretion as
to the propriety of moving to the new quarters. 6
Court furnishings and accessories have also been the subject of
many judicial-legislative disputes. In State v. County Court of
Kenosha County, 7 a county judge sought to compel the county to
pay for an air conditioner which he had installed in his courtroom
in an attempt to foster the administration of justice without inter-
ference from the heat and humidity. A round of confrontations
between the judge and the county purchasing agent resulted in the
agent being found in contempt of court for failing to testify at a
hearing on the issue held by the judge. Addressing itself to the
44. Id. at 121, 134 N.W. at 495.
45. Id.
46. See also In re Board of Commissioners of Caldwell Co., 4 N.C. App. 626, 167
S.E.2d 488 (1969), where an order was issued to county board commissioners to provide
sufficient space for the clerk of the county court. The board ignored the order and was found
in contempt. On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the contempt
proceedings, finding that the initial order to the board regarding the office space was vague,
but it did not deny the court's authority to make such an order.
47. 11 Wis. 2d 560, 105 N.W.2d 876 (1960).
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authority of the court to conduct such hearings, the supreme court
stated:
The court had jurisdiction to conduct the proceeding ex parte to
determine whether air conditioning was necessary to function
efficiently as a court and perform its duties. Such proceedings are
not without precedent. Early in the history of this state, it was
established that courts of record had an inherent power to ap-
point such assistance as they deemed necessary to expedite and
properly conduct judicial business."
Citing In re Janitor,9 Stevenson v. Milwaukee Co.,5" and In re
Courtroom,' the court continued:
True, in the instant case the county court did not make its record
showing the necessity for air conditioning as in In re Courtroom,
supra, and either procedure outlined therein is preferable to the
method used by the county court. However, the county court had
the jurisdiction to institute on its own motion the proceedings to
determine the question of necessity for air conditioning and that
was what it was ineptly doing. Whether or not air conditioning
of the Kenosha County Court room is necessary to its function-
ing as a court is a question which is not presented and not de-
cided. 2
The limitation of "established methods" has proven to be a
stumbling block to the exercise of inherent power in this area as
well.13 However, in a recent Massachusetts case an order issued
by a lower court to the county to pay for tapes and a tape recorder
was upheld as being within the court's inherent power. 4 The Mas-
48. Id. at 575, 105 N.W.2d at 884.
49. 35 Wis. 410 (1874).
50. 140 Wis. 14, 121 N.W. 654 (1909).
51. 148 Wis. 109, 134 N.W. 490 (1912).
52. 11 Wis. 2d at 577, 105 N.W.2d at 885. Also see State ex rel Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 26
Nev. 373, 68 P. 689 (1902), where a court ordered the state controller to purchase chairs
and carpets for the courtroom. Upon his refusal, the bailiff at the court's order purchased
the furniture of plaintiff and plaintiff sought to recover from the state. The Court stated:
In the absence of the statutory authority,. . . there exists, as we believe, the inherent
power in the court, growing out of and necessary to the exercise of its constitutional
jurisdiction, to make the order. The doctrine is not new, but has been recognized and
acted upon by the courts of other states, and we have been unable to find any
authority which holds to the contrary. 26 Nev. at _ , 68 P. at 691.
53. See, for example, Committee for Marion Co. Bar Ass'n v. County of Marion, 162
Ohio St. 345, 123 N.E.2d 521 (1954), where the installation of an elevator was not found
to be essential; Commissioners of Neosho Co. v. Stoddart, 13 Kan. 207, (Kan. 1874), as to
carpeting; and Cleary v. Eddy County, 2 N.D. 397, 51 N.W. 586 (1892) as to office rental
space.
54. O'Coins, Inc. v. Treasurer of the Co. of Worcester, 287 N.E.2d 608 (Mass. 1972).
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sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted that among the judici-
ary's inherent powers is the power to protect the court from the
impairment of its physical function, stating:
It would be illogical to interpret the constitution as creating a
judicial department with awesome powers over the life, liberty,
and property of every citizen while, at the same time, denying to
the judges authority to determine the basic needs of their courts
as to equipment, facilities, and supporting personnel."
The court overruled the county treasurer's contention that statu-
tory authority was required to enable a judge to bind the county
contractually for expenses reasonably 'necessary for the operation
of his court. Noting that a statute existed which could have af-
forded a basis for the court's decision, one commentator stated:
The significance underlying this approach was that by finding the
issue of judge-made contracts to be important enough to choose
a constitutional rather than a statutory basis for its decision, the
Supreme Judicial Court decisively took the issue away from the
legislature."
The pattern employed in the case is familiar with the court basing
its decision on the constitutional mandate of an independent and
impartial judiciary. 5
The limiting test of reasonable necessity has resulted in rever-
sals of some lower court appropriations."8 In an interesting Mis-
souri case a court had appointed an attorney to represent its inter-
ests in a contempt proceeding.59 The Missouri Supreme Court, on
55. Id. at 612.
56. Comment, Courts - Judge's Power to Bind Contractually County Treasury for
Courtroom Necessities, 7 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1136, 1137-1138 (1972).
57. Several cases have involved the issue of whether a court may set and order paid a
fee on behalf of a court-appointed attorney. In Knox Co. Council v. State ex rel McCor-
mick, 29 N.E.2d 405 (1940), the Indiana Supreme Court answered in the affirmative, stating
at 407-8:
The judiciary is an independent and equal co-ordinate branch of the government.
Courts were established for the purpose of administering justice judicially, and it has
been said that their powers are co-equal with their duties. In other words, they have
the inherent power to do everything that is necessary to carry out the purpose of their
creation.
Also see Grady v. Treasurer of Co. of Worcester, 352 Mass. 702, 227 N.E.2d 490 (1967).
58. Two cases are illustrative of instances wherein the courts have misjudged the reason-
able necessity of certain court-related expenses. See Board of Commissioners of White Co.
v. Gwin, 136 Ind. 562, 36 N.E. 237 (1894), regarding court remodeling, and Schmelzel v.
Board of Commissioners of Ada Co., 16 Idaho 32, 100 P. 106 (1909), concerning court-
ordered shaves and haircuts for jurors.
59. State ex rel Gentry v. Becker, 174 S.W.2d 181 (Mo. 1943).
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the issue of whether the county should pay the court-set fee, noted
that the most important and essential of inherent powers of the
court was the authority to protect itself against those who disre-
gard its dignity and disobey its orders by punishing for contempt.
However, as to the necessity of setting the attorneys' compensa-
tion, the court stated:
The court has the inherent power to punish for contempt and if
it has also the inherent power to appoint or request a lawyer, as
an officer of the court, to represent it or the state in the prosecu-
tion of the contempt proceeding, that is all the power the court
reasonably needs for its own protection, and for the due adminis-
tration of justice. The court could and did adequately protect
itself by exercising its inherent power of punishing for contempt
and appointing counsel and it was not necessary for the court to
further exercise its inherent power by allowing the fee in ques-
tion. 0
In what is perhaps the most far-reaching decision involving the
use of inherent power to support a court's order for necessary
expenses, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth ex
rel Carroll v. Tate,"' held that a court had the power to determine
what expenses were reasonable and necessary to its operations and
to compel the city to appropriate those funds and make them
available to the court irrespective of the amount of money avail-
able in the city budget!
Court efficiency weighed heavily in the decision. Basing its
holding on the right and power of courts to protect themselves
from impairment of their constitutional function, the Pennsylvania
court said:
[T]he judiciary must possess the inherent power to determine and
compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable
and necessary to carry out its mandated responsibilities, and its
powers and duties to administer Justice, if it is to be in reality a
co-equal, independent Branch of our Government."
However, the court emphasized that the burden of showing the
necessity of such demands was on the judges who made them and
was (as in Wayne) subject to appellate review. 63
60. Id. at 184-185.
61. 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193 (1971).
62. Id. at -, 274 A.2d at 197.
63. For in-depth discussions of the Carroll case as it relates to matters of judicial
independence in fiscal matters see: Comment, State Court Assertion of Power to Determine
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In a subsequent Pennsylvania case, Glancey v. Casey,4 newly
appointed municipal judges requested mandamus to order their
salaries paid retroactively to their assumpttion of office. Noting
that Carroll was inapposite because not involving judicial salaries,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the request, holding that
the legislatively-set period of retroactivity was adequate under the
circumstances. Although it has been cited as a retreat from the
bold position in Carroll,65 Glancey is probably more properly
viewed as an example of a more restrained application of the rea-
sonable necessity test.
3. Generalizations Regarding Inherent Power.
After such a review of the case law, what generalizations can
be drawn with regard to the concept of inherent power? At the
outset it should be noted that it is difficult to speak in a definitive
manner about the concept outside the context of the cases in which
it has been employed. Nevertheless, the cases present a general
idea of the power's scope, and demonstrate certain consistencies
and trends which reappear regardless of the particular use to which
the concept is being employed.
First, with respect to source, the courts in the various jurisdic-
tions seem in near-unanimous agreement that the power springs
from the constitutional mandate that the branches of government
be separated. From this "balance of power" concept comes the
court concern with judicial independence. To maintain this inde-
pendence, the judiciary has repeatedly held, it must possess the
power to protect itself from outside control and to maintain its
internal consistency. 6
As to scope, the cases demonstrate that the judiciary is bound
by "reasonable necessity" when dealing with a threat to the effec-
tive and efficient administration of justice.67 As a result, courts
appear to possess a wide range of discretion when dealing with
what they consider to be threats to judicial independence. The
vagueness of this "limitation" is probably responsible for most of
and Demand its own Budget, 120 U. PENN. L. REv. 1187 (1972); Hazard, McNamara &
Sentilles, Court Financing and Unitary Budgeting, 81 YALE L.J. 1286 (1972); and Note,
Judicial Financial Autonomy and Inherent Power, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 975 (1972).
64. Glancey v. Casey, 447 Pa. 77, 288 A.2d 812 (1972).
65. See Comment, State Court Assertion of Power to Determine and Demand its own
Budget, note 63 supra, at 1189.
66. See notes 13 and 16 supra and accompanying text.
67. See notes 27, 31 and 32 supra and accompanying text.
1974]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the inconsistencies which appear in the various cases employing the
concept of inherent power.
The most notable inconsistency is with respect to the effect that
legislative alternatives have on the exercise of judicial power. A
number of cases hold that a court may not take it upon itself to
remedy a supposed problem through inherent power where an es-
tablished method exists throirgh which the problem may be
solved. 8 Other cases, apparently to the contrary, hold that where
a situation demands judicial action, the fact that there is an estab-
lished legislative alternative does not impede court power. 9 The
resolution of this conflict of authority is undoubtedly based on
courts' differing views of what constitutes a reasonable necessity.
Many courts are willing to cooperate with legislative alternatives
because it appears reasonably certain that just results will be ob-
tained. Of course, the political considerations cannot be under-
played in such situations. Nevertheless, the fact remains (as has
been recognized by some courts) that if the legislative alternative
of the established method fails, inherent power remains as a means
to solving the problem.
The use of inherent power to accomplish meaningful court re-
form has been criticized on other grounds. 70 First, it is often
pointed out that *the power, where applied successfully, has been
used in matters of relative minor importance. The courts can af-
ford to use high-sounding terms in defense of judicial independ-
ence, it is said, where the stakes are small - where it would not
result in a showdown of power between the judiciary and either the
legislative or executive branch. Perhaps the most effective answer
to such an argument is the Carroll case, discussed in the section
of this article relating to the sources of inherent power, where the
Pennsylvania courts not only took on the legislative branch, but did
so in an area where one might most expect to see such a "show-
down" - the area of fiscal autonomy. Ultimately, although the
weight of political consequences as a deterrent factor cannot be
underplayed, it should be noted that the very configuration of
inherent power establishes it as a viable means to major court
reform.
A further criticism of the inherent power concept as a useful
tool in court reform stems from what some have termed its nature
68. See notes 22, 26 and 53 supra and accompanying text.
69. See notes 33, 35 and 54 supra and accompanying text.
70. See Note, Judicial Financial Autonomy and Inherent Power, note 63 supra.
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as a defensive instrument. It is argued that the power has only been
employed where the judicial system faces a direct threat from the
outside. It is contended that courts will be reluctant to employ the
concept to initiate offensive court reform. It must be conceded that
the cases generally involve direct conflicts which require immediate
court action. However, it must again be pointed out that the nature
of the power, as defined by the courts, does not prohibit its use in
instances involving no apparent conflict. The cases demonstrate
that the use of inherent power is justified when the courts perceive
any threat to the effective and efficient administration of justice.
The fact that a situation exists which is not the source of direct
judicial-legislative confrontation does not preclude the judiciary
from concluding that a threat to the administration of justice exists
which justifies the use of inherent power. In other words, the judici-
ary does not have to wait until the situation comes to a head before
remedial action is taken.
Another point of difference stemming from the nature of the
"reasonable necessity" limitation is the question of who is to deter-
mine the necessity. Generally, this is a point which has not received
a lot of attention. Some courts have held that the proper person
to determine the necessity is the individual who perceives the prob-
lem - generally, the lower court judge under the typical fact situa-
tion." Other courts have held either that the necessity is to be
determined, ultimately, by the court of last resort in the jurisdic-
tion or, (and this is perhaps the same thing), that a determination
of necessity is subject to appellate review. Some courts are required
to submit proposals for judicial action of this nature to the higher
courts or to a designated officer within the judicial system who is
to determine the necessity. However the issue is resolved, it is
apparent that the judiciary, as repository of the inherent power, is
to determine when the necessity of its use arises. On the other
hand, there does exist some conflict in the situation where the
necessity is challenged as to who has the burden of proof on the
matter. Varying jurisdictions have placed it on the judiciary or on
the body challenging its use.
In summary it can probably be said that the fact that the limits
of inherent power are so vaguely drawn works both as an aid and
a hindrance to its use. Depending upon the attitude of a particular
court, "reasonable necessity" may require that the power be con-
strued broadly or narrowly. And this would hold true, not only as
71. See notes 16 and 20 supra and accompanying text.
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one moves from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but even as one moves
from situation to situation within a given jurisdiction.
III. SELECTED PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY PROPOSALS OF CHIEF
JUDGE STUDY COMMITTEE
The review of case law and the commentary in the preceding
section has outlined the source and scope of the judiciary's inherent
power. It should again be emphasized that what is "inherent
power" is very much dictated by the context of cases in which it is
sought to be employed. In other words, from the general notion
of a power to do all that is reasonably necessary to preserve judicial
independence and guarantee the efficient administration of justice,
courts faced with specific problems shape "inherent power" to fit
their special requirements. It is therefore unreasonable to speculate
as to the judicial reaction to a particular problem which may arise.
However, this article is concerned with the possibility of judi-
cial self-help in effecting administrative court reform. Its premise
is that the doctrine of inherent power may be a viable means to
that end.
The Supreme Court's Chief Judge Study Committee, recogniz-
ing the problems caused by inefficient administrative procedures,
has been considering proposals that would establish, if adopted,
administrative districts headed by a chief judge with duties closely
paralleling the recommendations of the National Conference on
Metropolitan Courts for that position. Selected problems posed by
the Committee's proposals will here be considered in light of what
has been said about inherent power. At the outset it should be
pointed out that there are no easy answers to these problems since
there is no case law which directly supports action of this kind by
a state judicial system. Nevertheless, the very nature of the over-
all problem, affecting as it does the efficiency of the entire system
of justice in Wisconsin, particularly lends itself to resolution by
means of the judiciary's inherent power.
A. Creation of Administrative Districts
An integral part of the Study Committee's plan for administra-
tive reform is the creation of administrative districts. It has yet to
be determined whether such districts would coincide geographi-
cally with the present judicial district alignment. Recognizing that
the purpose of the proposals, as a whole, is to improve administra-
tive efficiency, it must at least be recognized that the present dis-
trict alignment might not be ideal for those purposes.
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Article VII, section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution states that
"for judicial purpose," the state is to be divided into judicial cir-
cuits. Section 6 of that article provides that the legislature may
alter or increase the number of circuits and change their bounda-
ries. The issue, then, is whether the supreme court could order the
creation of administrative districts which do not coincide with the
legislatively prescribed circuits. More specifically, does the consti-
tutional grant of authority to the legislature to alter the number
and change the boundaries of judicial circuits "for judicial pur-
poses" extend to the creation of such districts for internal adminis-
trative purposes?
This question of constitutional construction can best be re-
solved by evaluating the factual circumstances and policy consider-
ations which led to the adoption of the sections in question." On
April 20, 1836, Congress approved the territorial government in
what later became the state of Wisconsin. The newly established
legislature divided the territory into three judicial districts consist-
ing of two counties each. The circuit judge in each district also
served as a member of the territory's three-man supreme court.
The availability of a legal forum within the Wisconsin territory was
an accomplishment in itself. Prior to 1823 the area which now
constitutes Wisconsin had no courts which were capable of hand-
ling matters of any importance. Cases of any significance had to
be tried in Detroit and litigants were required to travel hundreds
of miles to have their day in court.
In 1838, the legislature re-distributed the territory's counties
among the three judicial districts. Counties which were small in
population and relatively unorganized were attached to the more
developed counties for purposes of defining the judicial system
geographically. The constitutional conventions of 1846 and 1848
witnessed much discussion both pro and con on the advisability of
having the circuit judges serve also as members of the supreme
court and on the creation of county courts. The convention ulti-
mately re-distributed the counties among the judicial circuits and
left it to future legislatures to change this arrangement as it became
necessary to do so. The debates surrounding this measure make it
clear that the primary concern was to make the judicial system
accessible to the people of the new state. In the words of the then
72. Most of the material in this historical analysis was gleaned from the Preface, 1
Pinney 4, pages 4-57, (1872).
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chief justice for the territory, the judiciary committee to the con-
vention:
.. . desired to establish a system which should be cheap, simple,
and adequate to the present wants of the people, leaving it to
future legislatures to make such further additions as the increase
of business and density of population might make expedient."
Viewed in this context, it is obvious that the concern of the drafters
of the constitution was primarily with creating judicial circuits
which would serve the needs of the people. Nowhere in the pub-
lished debates was any reference found to the internal administra-
tive management of the court system. It appears, then, that the
power given by Article VII, Section 6 to the legislature to alter the
composition of the circuits is one which relates solely to the exter-
nal structure of the court system with the purpose that the courts
be made as accessible as possible. This is borne out in part by the
debates concerning the need for county courts in addition to circuit
courts. The delegates who contended that they were not needed
prevailed at the time but the provision allowing the legislature to
create such courts if necessary reflects efforts by those who were
concerned that needs might change as population and business
increased. In short, the sections in question do not appear to bar
the creation of judicial districts by the supreme court for
administrative purposes.74
Assuming that there is no constitutional impediment, it re-
mains to be considered whether the creation of such districts might
be justified as an exercise of the supreme court's inherent power.
As courts have applied inherent power in the past, there first must
be a problem which threatens either judicial independence or the
efficient administration of justice. Courts have stated that the con-
stitutional separation of powers mandates that the judiciary main-
tain its independence as a separate branch of the government.
Further, the constitution entrusts to the judicial branch the task of
efficiently and effectively administering justice under the law.
There can be little doubt that, without effective administrative
guidelines and centralized control, the judicial system cannot oper-
ate as an organized, cohesive unit. Such disorganization creates
problems of administrative efficiency, unclear delineation of res-
ponsibilities, duplication of effort and, in some cases, unequal dis-
73. Journal of the Convention to form a Constitution for the State of Wisconsin, 372,
(Tenney, Smith and Hall 1848).
74. Id. at 346.
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tribution of the judicial workload. That a problem exists which
comes within the traditional scope of inherent power, then, can
hardly be disputed.
Recognition of a problem, however, has not always been
enough to warrant the resort to inherent power to resolve it. Many
courts are reluctant to take action where alternative methods of
solution are available. It cannot be denied that the problem may
be solved by appropriate legislative action. But such action has not
been taken in the past and there is no assurance that it is immedi-
ately forthcoming. Even those courts which adopt the "alternative
methods" limitation on the use of inherent power have recognized
its inappropriateness when those methods fail. The argument that
the problem is not of such magnitude or of such immediacy as to
warrant judicial action can only be met by pointing to those cases
which indicate that a court need not wait until a crisis situation
exists before remedial action is taken. And the fact that the system
continues to function in spite of such problems is no valid reason
to live with them. Ultimately, as the Wisconsin court has held,
when such a problem is recognized to exist, it is for the court to
determine the necessity of its solution.
In what manner, then, shall the court resolve what we have
construed to be a problem necessitating, or at least warranting, the
use of inherent power. In this regard, the court is guided only by
the test of reasonableness. Whatever means it may choose, as long
as reasonably designed to resolve the problem at hand, would ap-
pear to be appropriate. A comparison of the merits of the adminis-
trative districting plan encompassing the appointment of a chief
judge with other plans designed to solve the problem is not within
the scope of this article. That is for the court to decide. Neverthe-
less, under the rationale of inherent power and its test of reasona-
bleness, it cannot be said that the proposed plan is inherently un-
reasonable.
B. Chief Judge Position and his Powers
As to the necessity and reasonableness of creating the position
of chief judge, no more need be said than has been said with regard
to the creation of administrative districts. If the overall plan is
reasonable, it is fallacy to argue that an integral part of the plan
is not reasonable. However, some question may arise as to whether
the powers required to be exercised by this administrative official
are capable of being vested in one person. It is imperative that if
the chief judge is to resolve the problems facing the court in the
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area of administration, he must possess the powers necessary to
that task. One aspect of that task will be the effective control of
court-related personnel. There is ample case law supporting the
proposition that key court-related personnel are subject to the con-
trol and discipline of the courts.71
An initial problem relates to who may be considered court
employees or court personnel for purposes of court control and
direction. The case of Judges of 74th Judicial District v. County
of Bay discussed in the source of inherent power section of this
article, may help resolve this problem. 7 Although primarily con-
cerned with issues of labor representation, the case presents an
extensive discussion of who is and who is not considered a court-
related employee. The ramifications of the civil service statute have
yet to be resolved, but it appears that the system of employment
may be separable from the form of employment where it concerns
court-related functions essential to court operation and thus, tradi-
tionally, under judicial control.
The fact that such control has traditionally been exercised by
each particular judge over the employees of his own court should
not negate the authority of the chief judge under a plan of centrali-
zation of such control. Under the plan envisioned by the Commit-
tee, the chief judge would exercise no more authority or control as
to court employees than the individual judge has traditionally re-
tained. Essentially, the chief judge would wield the same authority
but from a different organizational standpoint. The power would
be exercised by the chief judge on behalf of the other judges in his
district in response to a supreme court directive.
C. Control over Municipal Judges
Whether the municipal judge, who is recognized by the case law
as existing at the whim of the legislative body which creates him
would come under the umbrella of control afforded the chief judge
by the proposed plan is another question which has not been re-
solved by the case law. Under the constitution of the state, the
supreme court has the power of supervision over all judges, regard-
less of the source of their creation. Although this power has been
utilized chiefly in matters of an adjudicatory nature, an argument
75. See Robbin v. Brewer, 236 So. 2d 448 (Fla. App. 1970); Woods v. R. D. Hunt and
Son, Inc., 207 Va. 281, 148 S.E.2d 779 (1966); Lambert v. State, 105 So. 2d 612 (Fla. App.
1958); and Martin v. Carroll, 235 Ala. 30, 58 So. 2d 106 (1952).
76. Note 41 supra.
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might be made that, since the supreme court is ultimately respon-
sible for the operation of the entire system of justice, it would be
within its power, inherent or otherwise, to direct their cooperation
in the reform project.
Not too much "bootstrapping" is required to reach the conclu-
sion that, although the superintending power has been limited to
relations between judges and litigants in adjudicatory matters, fail-
ure to cooperate in a project which is designed to increase the
litigant's chances for a speedy and just hearing, may be a violation
of the nature reserved for solution under the supervisory powers.
IV. CONCLUSION
There can be little doubt that administrative disorganization
and mismanagement have contributed greatly to the problems of
inefficiency which currently plague our nation's courts. A judicial
housecleaning will at some point be required to centralize the man-
agement and set guidelines for court operation. In Wisconsin, the
Supreme Court's Chief Judge Study Committee thinks it has the
answer in the form of administrative districts headed by a chief
judge who will coordinate the efforts of the judges under his direc-
tion. The issue addressed by this article is who is to implement this
plan. No doubt the legislature, in connection with called-for struc-
tural change, could put the proposals into effect. However, the
verities of politics dictate that hopes for early action in this area
are unrealistic.
This article has proceeded on the premise that the judiciary,
and especially the supreme court, has the responsibility to oversee
and insure the efficient and effective administration of justice.
With responsibility must also come power. That power must neces-
sarily be expansive enough to facilitate the performance of consti-
tutional mandates. The authorities cited herein present support, it
is believed, for the proposition that, by the exercise of its "inherent
power," the supreme court might implement whatever plans are
reasonable and necessary to insure the continued efficient and
effective administration of justice.
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